Israel and Hezbollah have reached principled understandings of a long-term ceasefire agreement on the northern border, after over a year of mediation by Amos Hochstein, the special envoy of President Biden to Lebanon, and Nabih Berry, chairman of the Lebanese parliament and leader of the Amal movement, according to reports from the global media. The agreement is expected to quiet the northern front for the first time since October 8 2023, when Hezbollah decided to join the campaign against Israel – but comes mainly against the backdrop of the recent two-month events, the severe blows that Israel inflicted on Hezbollah (from the beeper attack to the assassination of Nasrallah and the other leaders of the terrorist organization), and the ground maneuver that was carried out at various points along the border.
At the moment, it appears that Israel and Hezbollah have given the green light to Hochstein’s latest offer, and Prime Minister Netanyahu is expected to raise the agreement to a vote in the War Cabinet during the day. From the moment it is received, it will be possible to expect an immediate cessation of hostilities in the north, and a gradual return of routine throughout the northern region, as well as trends of the return of the residents of the north who are evacuated from their homes.
The Foundations of the emerging agreement
First, it is important to note that this is only a 60-day agreement, not a long-term arrangement. In 60 days, Hezbollah is supposed to withdraw north of Litani, and the IDF is supposed to gradually withdraw back to Israel, while at the same time, soldiers of the South Lebanon Army and UNIFIL will take their place. An international enforcement mechanism will be created for the removal of Hezbollah, which will include most Western countries; and Israel will maintain freedom of action against any disorder on the part of Hezbollah.
As part of the agreement, Israeli and Lebanese representatives will come into contact with a discussion about correcting various disputed points along the border, and later negotiations will also be conducted to return Hezbollah operatives who were taken prisoner – very few in number. Unlike the Gaza Strip border, a buffer zone will not be established along the southern border of Lebanon – and residents of the area will be able to return to their homes.
1701 – what is the difference?
If the settlement reminds you of Security Council Resolution 1701, which was adopted in August 2006 at the end of the Second Lebanon War and whose very failure to implement it is the main reason for this war, you are absolutely right, and in fact the present agreement even recognizes this and defines the powers of the enforcement apparatus in accordance with that decision: Strengthen the South Lebanon army, ban the possession of other weapons south of Litani, and prevent smuggling into the country of cedar.
The main difference lies in defining Israel’s capabilities – with Resolution 1701 restricting Israel from acting against violations, but the current agreement (within the framework of direct understandings with the United States) allows Israel to act to remove immediate threats against forces and civilians, as well as greater freedom of action in Syria’s skies. In addition, if Israel comes to the conclusion that the enforcement mechanism is not doing enough to prevent non-immediate threats, it will be able to act on its own to thwart them. These details of the agreement are the most sensitive, and are vague and deliberately worded – both for us and for Hezbollah.
Arguments for the agreement:
Since the basic details of the agreement were published between Israel and Hezbollah, a lively public debate has begun about the quality of the agreement – a cross-sector discussion and political parties, in which all sides should be heard by the people of Israel – which has a decision on a very fundamental issue, Relevant to the lives of all the residents here and will affect the near and distant future of Israel.
At the head of the agreement are Prime Minister Netanyahu, who was in charge of the talks with Hochstein, as well as Defense Minister Katz. The agreement reportedly enjoys the support of most senior military and military chiefs; we will wait to see whether it is by force of these elements to pass those opposed to the agreement and bring it to a Cabinet decision (with the expected vote today), and its implementation in the coming months.
An Israeli victory picture
First, it is important to clarify that the current war ends with a crushing Israeli victory, and an agreement at this time determines this victory. Hezbollah and its newspapers can continue to claim that an “equation” has been created between Lebanon and Israel, but in practice Israel has completely broken the organization: From the liquidation of most of its senior officials, including Nasrallah and the rest of the General Staff, to the killing of thousands of operatives of various levels (several times more than during the Second Lebanon War), to the elimination of capabilities (the destruction of positions and tunnels and the taking of large numbers of weapons in captivity) and the destruction of threats, including most of the terrorist organization’s extensive and developed rocket arsenal, which threatened to destroy and harm key sites throughout Israel.
In addition, Hezbollah has barely managed to hit Israel – with tens of thousands of launches a few civilians were hurt, and the maneuvering soldiers also did not encounter significant resistance at most points. The total number of casualties in this war is 2 times smaller than all the IDF and Israeli losses in the Second Lebanon War of 2006, even though Hezbollah has grown and invested all of it since that war, in preparing for this war. It is worth finishing the story now – keeping the picture of victory in our hands, and keeping the deep moral impact on the terrorist organization of the North.
American cooperation
It is important to remember that the United States, our closest ally, is very interested in this agreement (which it mediated itself), and is pushing it with all its might. The American leadership is in a transitional period, which in large part allows it to drive more freely – and right now, we must try to stand in line with Biden and the American leadership, in order to avoid measures that might harm the war effort, both on the northern and southern fronts.
In addition, the side document for the central agreement with Lebanon, which deals with American commitments to Israel, provides the IDF with broader and more significant guarantees on the part of our allies, for freedom of action in south Lebanon – the main practical difference between this agreement and Resolution 1701. We should take these guarantees with both hands, since in the future they will not necessarily be given.
A chance for rehabilitation
Some say that the agreement will give Hezbollah time to recover; it is true, but it is important to remember that the IDF also needs to be rehabilitated a little. After more than a year of high alert on all borders and active fighting on three fronts, the IDF should give its soldiers, regular and reserve, a little more breathing space. Let the forces freshen up, let the system stretch its muscles, pick up new weapons and embed insights into the soldiers. This will have a positive impact on the southern front as well.
An untenable agreement
The most important point to remember is that this is a two-step agreement – with 60 days of experience now to test its effectiveness. If the agreement does not prove itself during this period, the IDF will be able to return to Lebanon, and with Trump in the White House, which is expected to play in our favor.
Arguments against the Agreement:
It is important to note that many of the arguments against the agreement were heard from within the coalition itself – both from the right-wing parties, religious Zionism and Jewish power, and also within the Likud party. Some of the ministers announced that they would oppose the agreement, and according to the polls, most of the coalition voters also oppose it in a firm manner. We will have to wait and see if the agreement will be able to get the Cabinet approval.
Take advantage of the damage to Hezbollah
Many argue that the IDF has a duty to take advantage of the historic opportunity of the weakness that Hezbollah has encountered, as the organization has not experienced in nearly 20 years. It is estimated that almost all of Hezbollah’s headquarters and most of the leaders of the old guard (except for the current deputy secretary general and secretary general, Naim Qassem – who the IDF may has deliberately prevented from eliminating, assuming he is a weak leader) have been eliminated, making it very difficult for the organization to function continuously. In a situation where the enemy is lying on the groundand ‘bleeding’, there is no reason to stop and place a higher quality and deeper blows on him, which will make him permanently disabled. Israel should try to harm other Hezbollah systems, which have not lost most of its people, or its civilian system of government.
The threat has not been removed
Despite the significant blows that Hezbollah suffered, the threat on its part was not removed. It is estimated that the IDF destroyed most of the organization’s long-range missiles – but these missiles could also cause great damage if Hezbollah was given the opportunity to restore its power and renew its communications systems. Hezbollah is in a position to quickly recover and replenish its rocket reserves, not to mention the fitness of its offensive array – the Radwan Force. The dynamic will be similar to the one with Hamas before the war – and in no time will Hezbollah return to threaten us just as it was before the war, and even more so.
There is no security for the North
Given that the threat to Hezbollah will not be destroyed, and the arrangement includes mainly international guarantees – how can we expect the residents of the north to return peacefully to their homes? The last war revealed the complete destruction of UNIFIL, and the futility of security by multinational force – and the residents of the north will return only if they see that the IDF is able to provide them with security (which has not yet been done in this war).
In addition, it is important to note that Hezbollah still has tens of thousands of short-range missiles, rockets and mortars, which do not threaten Gush Dan, but certainly threaten the children of Kiryat Shmona (even when Hezbollah is beyond Litani). We discovered this in the 20th century. The threat still exists.
A 2006 rewritten script
The bottom line that accompanies most of these arguments against the agreement is that it is part of the agreement itself – the agreement is too similar to Resolution 1701 of 2006. Then the citizens of Israel were assured that long-term peace had been achieved, and here we are, in the third Lebanon war. To end the war in this way simply sets the stage for the fourth Lebanon war.
